Given a dataset containing sensitive personal information, a statistical database answers aggregate queries in a manner that preserves individual privacy. We consider the problem of constructing a statistical database using output perturbation, which protects privacy by injecting a small noise into each query result. We show that the state-of-the-art approach, -differential privacy, suffers from two severe deficiencies: it (i) incurs prohibitive computation overhead, and (ii) can answer only a limited number of queries, after which the statistical database has to be shut down. To remedy the problem, we develop a new technique that enforces -different privacy with economical cost. Our technique also incorporates a query relaxation mechanism, which removes the restriction on the number of permissible queries. The effectiveness and efficiency of our solution are verified through experiments with real data.
INTRODUCTION
The evolution of information technology has enabled an organization (e.g., hospitals, retailers) to collect large volumes of sensitive personal data (e.g., medical records, transaction history), which is usually referred to as microdata. To facilitate research, these organizations often need to provide public access to their microdata, which, however, may pose a risk to individual privacy. For example, assume that the Census Bureau maintains an online database for answering count queries on the microdata T in Table 1 , which contains three columns, Age, Zipcode, and Income (Name is included to facilitate row referencing). Consider an adversary who knows the age 20 and zipcode 15000 of Alice, and the fact that Alice is involved in T . To infer the income of Alice, the adversary may issue the following two queries q0 and q 0 : Permission to copy without fee all or part of this material is granted provided that the copies are not made or distributed for direct commercial advantage, the VLDB copyright notice and the title of the publication and its date appear, and notice is given that copying is by permission of the Very Large Data Base Endowment. To copy otherwise, or to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires a fee and/or special permission from the publisher, ACM. VLDB '08, August 24-30, 2008 , Auckland, New Zealand Copyright 2008 VLDB Endowment, ACM 000-0-00000-000-0/00/00. The answers of q0 and q 0 are 1 and 0, respectively. Once these results are returned, the adversary can assert that Alice's income must be above 80k, a close guess of Alice's real salary 85k. The above problem motivates statistical databases, which answer counting queries without leaking individuals' privacy. An effective approach is output perturbation [2, 6, 11, 13] , which works by injecting a small random noise into each query result. For queries that pinpoint sensitive information (e.g., q0 and q 0 ), their answers are dominated by noise; hence, privacy is preserved. On the other hand, the noise has little effect on queries that retrieve high-level statistics (e.g., find the number of people earning more than 30k), since they usually have large results.
Numerous output perturbation techniques are available in the statistics literature (see [2] and the references therein). Those techniques, however, are not based on a rigorous definition of privacy [12] . To overcome this defect, Dinur and Nissim [11] develop a principle called -differential privacy (to be elaborated in Section 2), and employs it to avoid queries that can reveal sensitive information. Specifically, let Q be the set of previously answered queries. Given a new query q, the database determines whether {q} ∪ Q violates -differential privacy. If yes, q is rejected; otherwise, the database reports a noisy result. As proved in [11] , this approach guarantees that an adversary can recover any sensitive information with very low probability, even if s/he has audited the results of all the queries in history.
Motivation
Despite being the state of the art, -differential privacy has two drawbacks that severely reduce its practical applicability. First, somewhat surprisingly, there is no existing solution for checking -differential privacy. As detailed in the next section, the difficulty stems from the computation of the so-called L1 sensitivity, which is a crucial component in verifying -differential privacy. The best efforts are due to Dinur et al. [13] , who point out several special cases where L1 sensitivity can be calculated. Similar attempts have also been made in [5, 19, 23] . Unfortunately, the calculation problem in general is still open. In other words, currently -differential privacy is virtually inapplicable when arbitrary queries are allowed. The second defect of -differential privacy also exists in all the previous output perturbation solutions. Specifically, when the database denies a query, it simply returns nothing. This incurs rather negative user experience, because a legitimate user would have to spend a long time trying different queries before getting an answer. Even worse, -differential privacy supports only a finite number of queries [11] . In other words, after a period of time, the statistical database will have to go offline, and all future queries are directly refused.
In fact, for a denied query q, it is possible to return a useful synthetic answer, which is synthesized from the reported answers of the past queries. To illustrate, assume that the database reported an answer a1 for query q1: If q 1 needs to be denied for privacy preservation, we may still return a1 to the user, along with the definition of q1 (so that the user knows a1 is the result of query q1 that relaxes her/his original query q 1 ).
Since the predicates in q1 and q 1 are similar, the answer a1 would still be useful to the user. We refer to the process as relaxation.
In general, relaxation may combine the results of multiple queries. To illustrate, consider: The exact result of q 3 equals the sum of those of q2 and q3. Assume that the database has returned a result a2 (a3) for q2 (q3), but denies q 3 . In this case, we may report a synthetic answer a2 + a3 for q 3 . Note that the answer is approximate, because a2 and a3 are noisy. Furthermore, returning the synthetic answer does not compromise any privacy guarantee. This is because both queries q2 and q3, as well as their reported results a2 and a3, are already public knowledge. Anything derived solely from such knowledge is also public knowledge. It is worth pointing out that the meaning of query relaxation in our context is drastically different from its counterpart in relational databases [18, 26] . Specifically, in [18, 26] , when an SQL query returns an empty result, relaxation performs the smallest modification to the query predicates in order to retrieve at least one tuple. The solutions in [18, 26] cannot be adapted to our circumstances.
Contributions
This paper proposes a novel output-perturbation solution based on an in-depth study of the algorithmic aspects of -differential privacy. First, we prove, for the first time, that exact computation of L1 sensitivity is NP-hard. Recall that L1 sensitivity is required in checking -differential privacy. Thus, the NP-hardness result rules out the existence of any algorithm for verifying -differential privacy efficiently.
Fortunately, it is possible to efficiently calculate a 2-approximate upper bound of the L1 sensitivity. This result leads to a fast approach that verifies -differential privacy in a safe, conservative, manner. Specifically, when -differential privacy does not hold, our solution always correctly indicates so, thus guaranteeing that privacy breach can never happen.
Another salient feature of the proposed technique is that it incorporates an effective query relaxation mechanism, to provide useful answers to the denied queries. This remedies the common defect of all the previous output-perturbation solutions (mentioned in Section 1.1), because now a user no longer needs to go through the annoying process of modifying her/his query repetitively. Instead, s/he immediately obtains a similar query suggested by the database, together with the query's answer. We perform extensive experiments to evaluate our algorithms, and confirm their effectiveness and efficiency in practice.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews -differential privacy and its related concepts. Section 3 studies the computation of L1 sensitivity, and presents our conservative method for verifying -differential privacy. Section 4 elaborates the details of query relaxation. Section 5 contains an experimental evaluation. Section 6 reviews the previous work related to ours. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper with directions for future work.
PRELIMINARIES
Let T be a microdata 
where xi and yi are two values in the domain of Ai 1 . We consider count queries, because of their imperative roles in various data analysis tasks, including OLAP, association rule mining, decision tree learning, etc.
Given a query q, we denote its real result on T as q(T ). To process queries in a privacy preserving manner, we adopt the outputperturbation methodology in [13] to design a statistical database D. Specifically, given a query q, D returns a perturbed answer q(T ) + δ, where δ is a random variable following a Laplace distribution, with a probability density function
λ is known as the noise magnitude of D, and is also the expectation of |δ|. We denote the perturbed answer as q(D). By injecting noise in the above manner, D ensures a strong type of privacy protection, -differential privacy [13] . This notion of privacy is formulated through the following definitions.
DEFINITION 1 (SIBLING TABLES). Two microdata tables T1
and T2 are siblings, if they have the same schema and cardinality, and differ in only one tuple. EXAMPLE 1. Let T1 be the microdata table T in Table 1 . By changing the income of Alice to another value (e.g., 30k), we obtain an alternative table T2. T1 and T2 are siblings. DEFINITION 2 ( -DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY [13] ). Let Q = {q1, ..., qm} be any subset of the queries that have been answered by D, and R = {r1, ..., rm} be a set of arbitrary real numbers. D ensures -differential privacy, if the following inequality holds for any R and any pair of sibling tables T1 and T2:
where ∆1 (∆2) denotes the event that T1 (T2) is the microdata on which D is constructed. EXAMPLE 1 (CONTINUED). Suppose that a statistical database D is built on T1. Consider an adversary who tries to infer the income of Alice. Let Q be the set of queries issued by the adversary, and Srslt the set of results returned by D. If D ensures -differential privacy ( 1), the adversary gains little knowledge about Alice's income, after observing Srslt. To understand this, let us assume that D is constructed on another microdata table (e.g., T2), where Alice's income is arbitrarily modified. By Definition 2, D may still return Srslt as the results for the queries in Q. In particular, P r D returns Srslt | Alice's income is NOT modified ≤ e · P r D returns Srslt | Alice's income is modified .
Notice that, when is small, e ≈ 1 + , which is close to 1. In other words, Srslt provides the adversary with very little information, regarding the income of Alice. In general, a smaller leads to tighter privacy protection.
As will be shown in Theorem 1, to decide whether D preserves -differential privacy, it suffices to inspect (i) the noise magnitude λ of D, and (ii) the L1 sensitivity of the queries answered by D.
DEFINITION 3 (L1 SENSITIVITY [13] ). Given a set Q of queries, its L1 sensitivity SL1(Q) equals:
where T1 and T2 are any two sibling microdata tables. EXAMPLE 2. Consider the queries q0 and q 0 in Section 1. Let Q = {q0, q 0 }. We will show that SL1(Q) = 2.
Let T1 and T2 be any two sibling microdata tables, and Q = {q0, q 0 }. Since T1 and T2 differ in one tuple, we have q0(T1) − q0(T2) ≤ 1 and q 0 (T1) − q 0 (T2) ≤ 1, which leads to
Consider that T1 equals Table 1 , and T2 is a sibling of T1, which changes Alice's income to 30k. We have q0(T1) = 1, q0(T2) = 0, q 0 (T1) = 0, and q 0 (T2) = 1. Therefore, SL1(Q) ≥ |1 − 0| + |0 − 1| = 2. Thus, SL1(Q) = 2. Based on Theorem 1, Dwork et al. [13] propose a framework for constructing D as follows. Before answering any query, we choose appropriate values for λ and , which decide the query accuracy and degree of privacy protection, respectively. Then, whenever a query q is issued to D, we inspect the set Q of queries that D has evaluated previously. If SL1(Q∪{q}) > λ, q is denied; otherwise, q(D) is returned as the result for q. In this way, D always ensures -differential privacy. Essential to the above framework is that we must be able to decide whether SL1(Q ∪ {q}) > λ for any query q. This turns out to be computationally difficult, as discussed in the next section.
THE HISTOGRAM APPROACH
In Section 3.1, we prove the NP-hardness of computing SL1(Q), and then give a method for deriving a 2-approximate upper bound of SL1(Q). Section 3.2 describes a histogram approach, which enables a statistical database to process each query in an efficient and privacy preserving manner. Finally, Section 3.3 points out a limitation of output perturbation, which motivates the solutions in Section 4.
Convergence of Queries
Let D be a statistical database, which has a noise magnitude λ, and has answered a set Q of queries. Given a new query q, our objective is to decide if D still preserves -differential privacy after answering q. By Theorem 1, it suffices to verify whether SL1(Q ∪ {q}) ≤ λ. The verification turns out to be NP-hard: LEMMA 1. Deciding whether SL1(Q) is larger than a threshold is NP-hard.
PROOF. See the appendix.
Combining the lemma with Theorem 1 leads to:
We thus switch our attention to calculating an upper-bound of SL1(Q ∪ {q}), which, as explained later, allows us to conservatively determine whether q can be answered. For this purpose, we introduce the following concepts. DEFINITION 4 (DATA SPACE / QUERY REGION). Given T , we define its data space Ω as a d-dimensional space, where the i-th dimension (1 ≤ i ≤ d) is Ai. The region of a query q is a rectangle r in Ω such that, for any i ∈ [1, d],
• if q has a predicate "Ai ∈ [xi, yi]", the projection of r on Ai equals [xi, yi];
• otherwise (i.e., q has a predicate "Ai = * "), the projection of r on Ai covers all values in Ai.
has a finite and discrete domain, Ω can be regarded as a set of d-dimensional points. Accordingly, the microdata T can also be viewed as a set of points. DEFINITION 5 (POPULARITY / CONVERGENCE). Let Q be a set of queries, and R be the set containing the regions of all queries in Q. For any point p in the space Ω, its popularity p(Q) in Q is the number of regions in R that cover p.
The convergence of Q, denoted as C(Q), is the largest p(Q) of all points p ∈ Ω. EXAMPLE 3. For example, let Q consist of the queries q1 and q2 in Section 1.1. Figure 1 shows their regions r1 and r2, namely, R = {r1, r2}. Any point p in r1 ∩ r2 has a popularity p(Q) = 2 in Q. If p is covered only by either r1 or r2, its popularity is 1. All points outside r1 and r2 have popularity 0. Thus, C(Q) = 2. for each bucket B ∈ S buk 7.
B.c = B.c + 1 8.
if B.c = λ/2 and |H| < θ, then Split(B) /* θ is the maximum number of buckets allowed */ 9. return ans 
PROOF. Let T1 and T2 be two sibling microdata tables, such that Σq∈Q q(T1) − q(T2) = SL1(Q). By Definition 1, there should exist only one tuple t1 (t2) in T1 (T2) that does not appear in T2 (T1). Let T3 and T4 be two tables such that T3 = {t1} and T4 = {t2}. We have Σq∈Q q(T3) − q(T4) = SL1(Q). For any q ∈ Q, q(T3) and q(T4) is either 0 or 1. Therefore,
implying that either Σq∈Qq(T3) or Σq∈Qq(T4) is at least SL1(Q)/2. Without loss of generality, assume Σq∈Qq(T3) ≥ SL1(Q)/2. Let p1 be the point in Ω whose i-th (1 ≤ i ≤ d) coordinate of p1 equals t1 [Ai] . Let R be the set of regions of the queries in Q. By Definition 5, at most C(Q) regions in R cover p1. Hence, t1 satisfies at most C(Q) queries in Q, i.e., Σq∈Qq(T3) ≤ C(Q). Therefore, SL1(Q)/2 ≤ Σq∈Qq(T3) ≤ C(Q), which completes the proof.
The lemma motivates a simple approach to ensure -differential privacy. We only need to maintain the popularity p(Q) for each point p ∈ Ω. Whenever a new query q is received, we inspect the points in Ω covered by the region of q. If all of them have popularities at most λ/2, q is answered; otherwise, q is denied. The approach, unfortunately, is impractical, since it requires keeping as many values as the points in the whole space Ω. To overcome this drawback, in the next subsection, we employ an approximation technique to monitor C(Q ∪ {q}) with small space.
A Histogram Approach
Let Q be the set of queries that have been answered by D, and R be the set of regions of those queries. We maintain a histogram H, which partitions the data space Ω into disjoint buckets with rectangular extents. Each bucket B ∈ H is associated with a counter B.c, equal to the number of query regions in R intersecting B. The largest number θ of buckets in H is a system parameter, decided by how much space can be allocated for H.
Apparently, any point p in B is covered by at most B.c queries in Q, i.e., the popularity p(Q) of p in Q is at most B.c. Therefore, 
(f) Figure 3 : Illustration of our histogram approach if B.c ≤ λ/2 for every bucket B ∈ H, we have p(Q) ≤ λ/2 for any point p ∈ Ω. Hence, by Lemma 2, SL1(Q) ≤ λ, indicating that D preserves -differential privacy (Theorem 1). Query Processing. The above observation leads to the algorithm Process in Figure 2 for answering queries. Given a new query q with region r, Process identifies the set Sbuk of buckets in H intersecting r. If any bucket in Sbuk has a counter at least λ/2, the answer ans for q is NULL, i.e., q is denied. Otherwise, Process reports ans = q(D) (recall that q(D) has included a Laplace noice), adds q to Q, and increases the counters of the buckets in Sbuk.
When |H| < θ (i.e., there is still space to store more buckets), counter increases may trigger bucket splits. Specifically, for any bucket B ∈ Sbuk, in case B.c = λ/2, Process invokes the Split sub-routine to decompose B in into new buckets. The details of Split will be elaborated shortly. T is Table 1 , and the maximum permissible popularity λ/2 is 3. Initially, H has a single bucket B1, which covers the entire data space, and its B1.c equals 0.
EXAMPLE 4. Suppose that the microdata table
The first query to our statistical database D is the q1 in Section 1.1), whose region r1 is illustrated in Figure 3a . B1 is the only bucket in H overlapping r1 (i.e., Sbuk = {B1} in the pseudocode of Process). Since B1.c = 0 ≤ λ/2 = 3, it is safe to answer q1; hence, we report q1(D) to the user. Accordingly, Q becomes {q1}, and B1.c equals 1. Figure 3b demonstrates the extent of B1, and its counter B1.c in the bracket.
The next two queries to D are the q2 and q3 mentioned in Section 1.1, whose regions r2 and r3 respectively are depicted in Figure 3c . Both q2 and q3 are answerable, as can be verified in the same way as q1. After returning q2(D) and q3(D), Q becomes {q1, q2, q3}, and the counter of B1 grows to 3, reaching the split threshold λ/2. Thus, B1 is decomposed (by the sub-routine Split) into B2 and B3, whose extents are shown in Figure 3d . The details Algorithm Split (B) /* B is a bucket to be decomposed */ 1. U = the set of regions of the queries in Q that partially intersect B 2. if U = ∅ 3.
remove B from H 4. r∩ = the intersection of all the regions in U 5.
if r∩ = ∅ 6.
split B into buckets B and B with the minimum B .c + B .c using the cutting lines passing the boundaries of the regions in U 7. else 8.
repetitively split B by the cutting lines passing the boundaries of r∩ until a bucket has extent r∩ 9. insert the new buckets into H with counters set to B.c
Figure 4: Bucket split algorithm
of the decomposition will become clear later. B2.c = 2 because B2 overlaps two queries q1 and q2 in Q. Likewise, B3.c is also 2.
The fourth query q4 to D is:
whose region r4 is presented in Figure 3e . Among the two buckets B2, B3 in H, only B3 intersects r4 (i.e., Sbuk = {B3}). Since B3.c = 2 < λ/2, q4 is answerable; D returns q4(D), and updates Q to {q1, q2, q3, q4}. B3.c becomes 3, triggering a split. Decomposition of B3 leads to 4 buckets B4, B5, B6, and B7, whose extents and counters are illustrated in Figure 3f . Finally, H includes totally five buckets. It is worth mentioning that, since B7 has a counter 3 = λ/2, all future queries whose regions intersect B7 will be denied. Figure 4 presents the details of Split, which Process deploys to decompose a bucket B whose counter B.c equals λ/2. Split begins by retrieving the set U of regions in R that partially intersect B (recall that R contains the regions of the set Q of previously-answered queries). If U = ∅, exactly λ/2 regions in R fully contain B. In this case, splitting B does not lower its counter, because all points in B have popularity λ/2 in Q. Hence, Split simply terminates, and keeps B in H.
Bucket Decomposition.
Next we focus on the case U = ∅. Split removes B from H, computes the intersection r∩ of the regions in U . Then, it divides B using one or more cuts:
Ω that is perpendicular to an axis. The cut of B by L results in buckets B and B , which are separated by L, and their union is B. We say that L is a cutting line.
In case r∩ = ∅, Split attempts all the cutting lines that go through a boundary of every region in U . Among those lines, Split decomposes B using the one that minimizes the sum of the counters of the new buckets, i.e., B .c + B .c is the smallest. We aim to minimize B .c + B .c, because a smaller B .c (B .c) allows us to answer more queries intersecting B (B ), i.e., a lower value of B .c + B .c leads to a larger number of admissible queries. EXAMPLE 4 (CONTINUED). Let us revisit the moment in Example 4 when the counter B1.c reaches the split threshold λ/2 = 3. At this point, Q = {Q1, Q2, Q3}, and their regions r1, r2, r3 are shown in Figures 3a and 3c . To decompose B1, Split identifies U = {r1, r2, r3}, since all these regions intersect B1. Clearly, r∩ is empty (in fact, the intersection of r2 and r3 is already empty). Thus, Split tries to cut B1 using the vertical/horizontal lines that contain the edges of r1, ..., r3. It can be verified that, among all those lines, the horizontal line Income = 40k is the best, achieving the smallest B1.c + B2.c = 4.
If r∩ = ∅, B is decomposed into multiple buckets, one of which has the extent exactly r∩. Split accomplishes this using only the set Scut of cutting lines that contain the boundaries of r∩. Clearly, Scut has 2d lines. Split randomly picks one of them, and uses it to decompose B into B , B . One of B , B is disjoint with r∩, and is retained in H directly. Suppose, without loss of generality, that B is disjoint with r∩; then, B must cover r∩, and is split further using another cutting line from Scut. This process is repeated, until the extent of a bucket is r∩. To understand why we decompose B in such a way, observe that any point in r∩ (B − r∩) is covered by exactly λ/2 (at most λ/2 − 1) queries. In other words, all queries that intersect r∩ should be denied, whereas any queries that cover only the points in B − r∩ can be answered. Therefore, we separate r∩ from the other points in B.
EXAMPLE 4 (CONTINUED)
. Consider the moment in Example 4 when the counter B3.c equals 3. At this time, Q = {Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4}, whose regions r1, ..., r4 can be found in Figures 3a, 3c, 3e . To decompose B3, Split finds U = {r1, r3, r4}. Note that r2 is not included since it is disjoint with B3. The intersection r∩ of all regions in U is the shaded area in Figure 3e . Therefore, Scut has four cutting lines: Age = 30, Age = 50, Income = 40k, and Income = 70k, each of which contains an edge of r∩, respectively. B3 is decomposed into B4, B5, B6, B7 by using the lines Age = 30, Age = 50, Income = 70k in this order.
Split can be implemented in O ( λ · log( λ)) time. Since Process invokes Split at most (θ) times, it has a time complexity O (θ λ · log( λ)), where θ is the number of buckets.
Limitation of Output Perturbation
We close this section with a theoretical result on the maximum number of queries that can be answered without violating -differential privacy. Given a query q, we define its volume as the percentage of points in Ω that qualify its WHERE condition. Specially, a query with predicate "Ai = * " on all Ai (i ∈ [1, d]) has a volume 1. Then:
LEMMA 3. Consider any solution that (i) guaranteesdifferential privacy, and (ii) perturbs each query answer by a
Laplace noise having magnitude λ. Let θ be the maximum number of queries that can be processed by such a solution. Then,
if each query has a fixed volume s
(0 < s < 1), θ < λ 2s(1 − s) ;(3)
if each query has a volume at least s and at most
PROOF. Assume that the solution has answered a set Q of queries. Due to -differential privacy, by Theorem 1, SL1(Q) ≤ λ. Let n = |Ω|, and pi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) be the i-th point in Ω. Without loss of generality, suppose that, among all points in Ω, p1 has the largest popularity in Q. Then,
Let Q1 be the set of queries in Q whose regions cover p1, and
Assume for the moment that Z is valid (we will prove Z shortly). In the following, we will first show that, when each query in Q has a volume s, |Q| < λ 2s (1−s) holds. Since each query in Q covers n · s point in Ω, we know
which implies that Σ n i=2 pi(Q1) = |Q1| · (n · s − 1), and Σ n i=2 pi(Q2) = (|Q| − |Q1|) · n · s. Furthermore, Equations 5 and 6 lead to p1(Q) ≥ |Q| · s. Then, by proposition Z, we have Σ
Next, we will show that, when each query in Q has a volume in
holds. Let vol(q) denote the volume of any query q. By proposition Z, we know Σ
In other words, (n − 1)SL1(Q) ≥ |Q| · n · s , which implies that
It remains to prove proposition Z. Assume, on the contrary, that there exists j ∈ [2, n] such that
Let Q3 be the set of queries in Q1 whose regions contain pj. Let t1 and t2 be the tuples corresponding to p1 and pj, respectively. Let T1 (T2) be a microdata table including only t1 (t2). By Definition 1, T1 and T2 are siblings. Since any query in Q3 covers both p1 and pj, it holds that ∀q ∈ Q3, q(T1) = q(T2) = 1.
As each query in Q1 − Q3 covers p1 but not pj, we know
Furthermore,
Combining Equations 8, 9, and 10,
As
By our hypothetic assumption earlier, the above is greater than SL1(Q). Thus, we have arrived at Σq∈Q|q(T1) − q(T2)| > SL1(Q), which contradicts Definition 3.
Equation 4 leads to the following corollary.
COROLLARY 2. Let n be the total number of points in Ω. To guarantee -differential privacy, any solution, which perturbs each query answer by a Laplace noise with a magnitude λ, can process at most n · λ queries with volumes in (0, 1).
PROOF. For any
, the total number of allowable queries is at most λ/(1/n), which proves the corollary.
Hence, any output-perturbation method leveraging Laplace noise can answer at most O(n) queries (where n = |Ω|), after which the statistical database will simply stop functioning. In contrast, the total number of possible queries on Ω is Θ(n 2 ). The next section presents a technique to remedy this drawback.
QUERY RELAXATION
The solution in Section 3 denies a query if answering it violates -differential privacy. As explained in Section 1.1, query denial reduces the utility of the database. In the sequel, we remedy the problem with query relaxation.
Specifically, let q * be a query that is rejected by the statistical database D. Query relaxation returns (i) the definition of a query q * , and (ii) a synthetic answer v for q * . In particular, q * may not necessarily be the same as q * , but in case they are not, q * is similar to q * . Furthermore, v is synthetic, because it derivation differs from the normal process that D uses to compute an answer (recall that, if D accepts a query, then the answer is obtained by adding a Laplace noise to the query's real result). In particular, v is synthesized by utilizing only the reported answers of the past queries. Remember that those queries and their reported answers are already publicly available. Thus, query relaxation is using only the public knowledge to infer the result of q * . This guaranteesdifferential privacy because, as mentioned in Section 1.1, whatever derived solely from public information remains public knowledge.
Compound
To avoid ambiguity, we say that D accepts a query if D returns a perturbed answer using the method in Section 3 (i.e., processing the query causes no privacy violation). Accepted queries are distinguished from the other denied queries, for which D produces synthetic answers via relaxation. Given any set S of accepted queries, its total answer equals the sum of the reported answers of all queries in S.
Let Q be the set of accepted queries in history, and q * a denied query whose region is r * . Relaxation looks for a subset P+ of Q, r r r r difference region r containing accepted queries whose regions can be put together to form a rectangle similar to r * . Then, we use the total answer of P+ as the synthetic answer for q * . However, some queries in P+ may have overlapping regions in which case their intersections are overcounted. Therefore, to increase accuracy, relaxation also searches for another subset P− of Q, involving queries whose regions correspond to the intersection areas in P+. To cancel the effect of over-counting, we subtract the total answer of P− from that of P+. The pair of (P+, P−) constitutes a compound, which is formalized below: DEFINITION 7 (COMPOUND). Two disjoint sets P+ and P− of queries constitute a compound P , if:
1. For each point p in the data space Ω, p(P+) − p(P−) equals 0 or 1, where p(P+) and p(P−) are the popularities of p in P+ and P−, respectively.
2. All points p ∈ Ω satisfying p(P+) − p(P−) = 1 form a rectangle rdiff, which is the difference region of P .
We refer to |P+ ∪ P−| as the size of P . As explained earlier, we compute a synthetic answer of P by
where q(D) is the reported answer of an accepted query q. Intuitively, condition 1 of Definition 7 requires no over-counting at all in the synthetic answer of P . The difference region rdiff, formulated in condition 2, is exactly the region that the synthetic answer corresponds to. Furthermore, rdiff is also the relaxed query q * returned to the user. Hence, condition 2 demands rdiff to be a rectangle. EXAMPLE 5. Assume that Q consists of four queries qA, qB, ..., qD, whose regions rA, ..., rD are illustrated in Figure 5 . Let P+ = {qD} and P− = {qA, qB, qC }. Then, P = (P+, P−) is a compound. Specifically, for any point p outside rD, its popularities p(P+) and p(P−) in P+ and P− respectively are both 0. For any point p inside rD but outside the grey area, p(P+) and p(P−) are both 1. For any point p in the grey area, p(P+) = 1 whereas p(P−) = 0. Hence, condition 1 is fulfilled. Furthermore, condition 2 is also satisfied because p(P+) − p(P+) = 1 only when p is in the shaded area, which is thus the difference region of P . The synthetic answer of P equals qD
Ideally, the difference region rdiff of a compound P should be identical to the region r * of the denied query q * . When this is not true, we need a metric for quantifying the quality of a compound. The next subsection addresses this issue.
Relaxation Error
Let r be an axis-parallel rectangle in the space Ω. Denote its projection on the i-th dimension (1 ≤ i ≤ d) as [r.xi, r.yi]. Also, use Ai.max (Ai.min) to represent the maximum (minimum) value on the i-th axis. As mentioned earlier, given a denied query q * with region r * , we want to find a compound P whose difference region rdiff is as similar to r * as possible. To measure the similarity between rdiff and r * , we introduce the following metric:
Algorithm Patch-check (P , q) /* P is a compound and q an accepted query */ 1. r diff = the difference region of P 2. r = the region of q * 3. if r diff ∩ r = ∅ 4. if the union of r diff and r is a rectangle 5.
if the relaxation error drops after including q in P + 6.
return P + 7. else if r diff covers r and r diff − r is a rectangle 8.
if the relaxation error drops after including q in P − 9.
return P − 10. return NULL 
DEFINITION 8 (RELAXATION ERROR)
. Let P be a compound and q * a denied query with region r * . The relaxation error E(P, q) equals
where weights w1, ..., w d can be any positive values.
Weight
is a constant reflecting the importance of dimension Ai. A large wi means that Ai is imperative, such that even a small difference between r * and rdiff along this dimension may cause heavy penalty. A small wi achieves the opposite effect. For simplicity, in the sequel, we assume w1 = ... = w d = 1 because our solutions extend to arbitrary weights directly.
Given a compound P , Equation 13 suggests an easy way to identify which query can be inserted in P to reduce relaxation error. We refer to such a query as a patch: DEFINITION 9 (PATCH). Let Q the set of accepted queries and P = {P+, P−} be a compound. Consider a query q ∈ Q that does not belong to P yet. We say that q is a positive (negative) patch if, after including q in P+ (P−), (i) P remains a compound and (ii) E(P, q * ) decreases. Figure 6 gives an algorithm Patch-check for verifying whether a query q is a patch for a compound P = {P+, P−}. In case it is, Patch-check indicates whether q should be added to P+ or P−. If q is not a patch, the algorithm returns NULL. Next, we illustrate the algorithm using an example. EXAMPLE 6. Assume that Q contains qA, qB, qC whose regions rA, ..., rC are shown in Figure 7a . Rectangle r * is the region of a denied query q * . Consider a compound P = (P+, P−), where P+ = {rA} and P− = ∅. The difference region rdiff of P is rA.
To see whether qB is a patch, Patch-check starts by noticing that rB is disjoint with rdiff (Line 3 of Figure 6 ). In this case, the algorithm examines if the union of rdiff and rB is a rectangle (Line 4). The answer is negative, and therefore, Patch-check returns NULL. The region rC of qC , on the other hand, is disjoint with rdiff, and meanwhile, can union rdiff into a rectangle. Hence, Patch-check examines whether inclusion of qC in P+ reduces the relaxation error (Line 5). For this purpose, it obtains the new rdiff (if rC is indeed inserted in P+), which is the shaded area in Figure 7a compared to the original rdiff, the shaded area is more similar to r * , implying lower relaxation error. Therefore, qC is a positive patch, and Patch-check returns P+ (Line 6).
Consider another example, where rA, rB, rC , r * are demonstrated in Figure 7b (rA is the bold rectangle). Again, suppose P = (P+, P−), where P+ = {rA} and P− = ∅, and apparently, the rdiff of P is rA. Let us apply Patch-check to verify whether qB is a patch. Since rB intersects rdiff, Patch-check executes Line 7, and proceeds only if (i) rdiff encloses rB and (ii) the difference between rdiff and rB is a rectangle. Here, although (i) is true, (ii) is not. Hence, Patch-check finishes with NULL. On the other hand, rC satisfies both (i) and (ii), and thus, Patch-check proceeds to inspect the relaxation error after adding qC to P− (Line 8). The shaded area in Figure 7 shows the new rdiff (if qC is in P−), which is a better approximation of r * than the original rdiff. Hence, qC is a negative patch, and the algorithm terminates with P− (Line 9).
Artificial Patches
So far we have assumed that a compound P contains only the queries in Q that are explicitly issued by users in the past. This section explores another possibility: we can also dynamically generate a query, force the database to process it normally (i.e., using the solution in Section 3), and then, use its perturbed answer to obtain a better synthetic answer for the denied query q * . To illustrate, consider Figure 8a , where r * is the region of q * , and rdiff (the bold rectangle) is the difference region of the current compound P . Obviously, rdiff is a poor approximation of r * . Imagine, however, that we had an accepted query qA in Q whose region is rA. This query is a negative patch, because its inclusion in P− shrinks rdiff to the shaded area, which is significantly more similar to r * . In fact, even though qA is not in Q, we can instruct the database D to process it (as an accepted query) right away, after which qA can be incorporated in Q, and hence, becomes a candidate patch to be selected by Patch-check ( Figure 6 ).
In Figure 8a , the artificial query qA aligns with the right edge of r * . Sometimes, it is better to align with the left edge of r * . For example, let us examine Figure 8b , where rB is the region of an artificial query qB. Apparently, qB a positive patch, as its insertion in P+ expands rdiff to the shaded area, which has much lower relaxation error. Similarly, artificial queries may also be created on the y-dimension, by aligning with the upper and lower edges of r * , respectively.
In general, given a compound P with difference region rdiff, we prepare an artificial patch-set Sarti as follows. First, Sarti is initiated with 2d artificial queries, each of which aligns with a boundary of rdiff (details clarified shortly). Then, we invoke Patch-check to eliminate those queries in Sarti that are not patches (i.e., they do not reduce the relaxation error). Some remaining queries may be denied by D due to -differential privacy (i.e., if they intersect a bucket in the histogram H with counter λ/2; see Section 3), and are also removed from Sarti. The resulting Sarti is the final artificial patch-set.
It remains to explain how to obtain the initial 2d queries in Sarti.
Algorithm Relax (q * , ξ) /* q * is a denied query, and ξ the maximum compound size */ 1. q = the query in Q minimizing E(P, q * ), where P + = {q}, P − = ∅, and P = {P + , P − } 2. ans = the reported answer of q 3. while the size of P is smaller than ξ 4. M = the set of queries in Q that are patches for P /* using Patch-check in Figure if M = ∅ then goto Line 14 7. else 8.
q = the patch in M whose insertion in P minimizes E(P, q) 9. if q / ∈ Q then x = Process(q) 10 . else x = the reported answer of q 11.
if q is a positive patch 12.
P + = P + ∪ {q }; ans = ans + v 13.
else P − = P − ∪ {q }; ans = ans − v 14. return ans and the difference region of P
Figure 9: The relaxation algorithm
Specifically, the (2i − 1)-th (1 ≤ i ≤ d) query has a region whose projection on dimension Aj is:
Similarly, the region of the 2i-th query has the following projection on Aj : 
Probabilistic Accuracy
Recall that, given a compound P , we return a synthetic answer v calculated by Equation 12 , and a relaxed query q * . The value v is actually an unbiased estimate the real result q * (T ), but has a variance proportional to the size of P : PROOF. For any query q in P+ or P−, let δq be the noise that D injects into q(D). Denote v as the value of Equation 12.
By Equation 1, the mean and variance of Σq∈P + δq − Σq∈P − δq are 0 and 2λ 2 ·|P+ ∪P−|, respectively. Hence, v has an expected value Σq∈P + q(T ) − Σq∈P − q(T ), and variance 2λ 2 · |P+ ∪ P−|. Next, we will show that Σq∈P + q(T ) − Σq∈P − q(T ) = q * (T ). Consider the i-th (1 ≤ i ≤ |T |) tuple ti in T . Let pi be the point representation of ti in Ω, and G = {pi | 1 ≤ i ≤ |T |}. Thus, Σq∈P + q(T ) = Σp∈Gp(P+), and Σq∈P − q(T ) = Σp∈Gp(P−).
Let rdiff be the difference region of P , which is also the region r * of q * . By Definition 7, for any point p ∈ Ω, p(P+) − p(P−) = 1 if p ∈ rdiff; otherwise p(P+) − p(P−) = 0. Hence,
which completes the proof. Since the variance of the synthetic answer grows with the size of P , we allow the user to specify an upper-bound ξ on the size of a compound, i.e., there can be at most ξ queries in P+ ∪ P−. The value of ξ controls the tradeoff between relaxation error and query accuracy: a larger ξ leads to compounds consisting of more queries, which lowers relaxation error but increases the noise in the query results; on the other hand, a smaller ξ ensures less noisy query answers, but may incur higher relaxation error.
Relaxation Algorithm
Based on the previous analysis, Figure 9 formally presents the query relaxation algorithm Relax. Given a denied query q * , Relax starts with a simple compound P whose P− is empty, and its P+ contains the query in Q (the set of accepted queries) most similar to q * . Then, Relax proceeds in rounds, each of which adds a query to P to minimize the relaxation error. Such a query is chosen from both Q and the artificial patch set Sarti computed as in Section 4.3. More rounds are carried out until either the size of P has reached the upper bound ξ, or no more patch can be found. EXAMPLE 7. Assume that D has accepted the set Q of queries q1, q2, q3, q4 before, whose regions r1, ..., r4 are illustrated in Figure 10a . At this point, the histogram H has the buckets in Figure 10b , and the largest permissible bucket counter λ/2 equals 3 (for ensuring -differential privacy). Now, D receives a new query q5 whose region r5 is shown in Figure 10c . D denies q5, because r5 intersects a bucket B7 , whose counter 3 equals λ/2. Then, D invokes Relax to derive a synthetic answer. Assume the maximum compound size ξ to be 3.
Among all the queries in Q, q2 is the most similar to q5; hence, Relax initializes P+ = {q2} and P− = ∅. Clearly, the difference region rdiff of P is r2, i.e., the shaded area in Figure 10a .
The algorithm enters the first round. Relax builds a set M of patches of P . For this purpose, it employs Patch-check ( Figure 6 ) to examine every query in Q that is not in P yet. The examination reveals that q3 is a positive patch; hence, M = {q3}. Then, Relax computes the artificial patch-set Sarti in the way described in Section 4.3, and adds all queries of Sarti to M . It can be verified that here Sarti = ∅, thus causing no change in M . As q3 is the only element in M , it is inserted in P+ (remember that q3 is a positive patch), which thus becomes {q2, q3}. This changes the difference region rdiff to be the shaded area in Figure 10c . In the second round, Relax creates a set M of patches in the same manner. This time, no query from Q is added to M . The artificial patch-set Sarti, on the other hand, has a negative patch q6, whose region r6 is given in Figure 10d . Thus, M includes only q6, which is placed in P−. As a result, the difference region rdiff shrinks to the shaded area of Figure 10d . At this time, P+ = {q2, q3} and P− = {q6}.
Now that the size of P has reached the upper bound ξ = 3, Split finishes, and returns the synthetic answer of P , and the final rdiff. After this, q6 needs to included in Q (which is now Q = {q1, q2, q3, q4, q6}) because, as explained in Section 4.3, an artificial query is processed normally using the solution in Section 3.
Each round of Relax examines the queries in Q once, which takes O(θ λ) time because Q contains at most θ λ/2 queries, where θ is the number of buckets in the dynamic histogram. Since there are at most ξ rounds, Relax runs in O(ξθ λ) time.
EXPERIMENTS
This section experimentally evaluates the effectiveness of the proposed solutions. We use a real dataset CENSUS (obtainable from http://www.ipums.org) with one million tuples, each storing the information of an American. It has four attributes: Age, Education, Occupation, and Income, whose domain sizes are 79, 14, 23, and 100, respectively. We aim at guaranteeing -differential privacy with a noise magnitude λ = 2000. This choice of λ ensures that the expected absolute error of each query answer is a small value 2000 (as explained in Section 2), which accounts for only 0.2% of the cardinality of CENSUS.
Each query has the form: select count(*) from CENSUS where A1 ∈ [x1, y1] and A2 ∈ [x2, y2]. Here, A1 and A2 are two random attributes of CENSUS. Interval [xi, yi] falls in the domain of Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ 2), and its length yi−xi equals √ s·(Ai.max−Ai.min), where Ai.max (Ai.min) is the maximum (minimum) value in the domain of Ai, and s the query volume (defined in Section 3.3). The center zi of [xi, yi] follows one of the following distributions, which reflect the patterns of users' queries in practice [7] :
, where t is a tuple randomly selected from CENSUS.
• Uniform: zi is a random value in the domain of Ai.
A (Data-or Uniform-) workload contains 20k queries with an identical s obeying the same distribution. Table 2 summarizes the parameters examined in our experiments. Unless otherwise stated, each parameter is set to its default value (bold in the table) in each experiment. All the experiments are accomplished on a computer with a 3 GHz Pentium IV CPU and one gigabytes memory. Processing Capacity without Relaxation. The first set of experiments studies the number of queries that can be answered by our Histogram approach (Section 3) without query relaxation. For comparison, we implement the only existing solution [13] that ensures -differential privacy in handling count queries. This solution, In the experiment of Figure 11a , we submit the queries in a Dataworkload to the underlying statistical database, and measure the number of processed queries, as a function of the number submitted. The figure demonstrates the results of Disjoint, Histogram adopting various numbers θ of buckets, and the theoretical upper bounds given by Lemma 3. Figure 11b illustrates the results of a similar experiment with a Uniform-workload. For each θ, the curve of Histogram initially increases because, during this period, the bucket counters are smaller than the limit λ/2, thus permitting additional queries to be processed. The curve eventually turns horizontal, when the counters have reached the limit.
We use the term processing capacity to refer to the total number of queries in a workload that are answered by the database. Observe that the capacity of Histogram grows along with θ. This is because a histogram with more buckets provides a better estimate of C(Q), and hence, reduces the chance of denying a query that could have been processed (if the real C(Q) was maintained). Nevertheless, we witness no obvious gain by raising θ beyond 10 5 , implying that θ = 10 5 already offers adequate precision for maximizing the processing capacity. When θ is fixed, Histogram is able to answer more queries in a Uniform-workload than in a Dataworkload. This is due to the fact that, uniform queries have less overlap in their regions, which leads to a lower C(Q), and hence, fewer query denials.
For uniform queries and θ = 10 5 , the processing capacity of Histogram approaches the upper bound, which confirms the effectiveness of the proposed bucket maintenance algorithm. Since an upper bound assumes an "ideal" query distribution, it is reasonable for the actual capacity to be lower, especially given a "bad" distribution such as Data. Notice that Histogram has significantly higher capacity than Disjoint. Since this is true in all the subsequent experiments, we omit Disjoint in the following diagrams.
Next, we investigate the effects of and s on the processing capacity of Histogram. Figure 12a the upper bounds. The capacity increases linearly with . This is expected, because the capacity is proportional to the limit λ/2 on C(Q), which, in turn, is linear to . On the other hand, a greater s results in a smaller capacity, since handling queries with larger regions causes faster growth of C(Q). Quality of Relaxation. The effectiveness of query relaxation (Section 4) is determined by: (i) the relaxation error (calculated by Equation 13 ) and (ii) the size of the final compound. The former indicates the amount of modification to the original query's predicates, whereas the latter determines the variance of a synthetic answer (see Lemma 4) .
By varying ξ from 1 to 5, Figure 13a (13b) illustrates the average relaxation errors (compound sizes) of the queries that demand relaxation in Data-and Uniform-workloads, respectively. The average error is very small, indicating that a compound region used to derive a synthetic answer is almost identical to the original query region. The error decreases as ξ escalates, since allowing a larger compound raises the chance of finding a good compound (whose region incurs little relaxation error). The average compound size is fairly low, implying a small variance in the reported answers. Note that a compound size can be well below ξ, because the relaxation algorithm may terminate before the size reaches ξ.
In Figure 14a (14b), we plot the average relaxation error (compound size) as a function of , when this parameter distributes from 0.1 to 0.5. Both factors decrease as becomes larger. To understand this, recall that a greater allows the database to process more queries (see Figure 12a) , rendering a larger set Q usable by relaxation, and thus, enhancing relaxation quality. Figures 15a and 15b demonstrate the relaxation error and compound size, as s is varied between 1% and 16%. The two factors increase with s, which can again be explained by the relationship between the relaxation quality and the database's processing capacity (c.f. Figure 12b) . In all cases, the relaxation error and compound size remain at very low levels, confirming the usefulness of our synthetic answers. Computation Overhead. In the next set of experiments, we evaluate the average processing time required by our technique in answering queries. Figures 16a and 16b with the increase of (decrease of s), due to the following reasons. First, a larger leads to a greater processing capacity, as shown in Figure 12a . In turn, a high processing capacity renders the maintenance of the dynamic histogram less efficient, because each execution of Split requires a scan through all previously answered queries (see Line 1 in Figure 2 ). Consequently, the computation time increases with . On the other hand, a larger s results in a smaller processing capacity (see Figure 12b) , and hence, a lower computation cost. Figure 16c demonstrates the computation overhead as a function of ξ. The overhead increases with ξ, since a greater ξ enables our technique to utilize larger compounds (for query relaxation), which, however, require more time to construct. In Figure 16d , we plot the processing overhead, varying θ from 10 2 to 10 6 . The overhead escalates with the increase of θ. This is because, a larger θ allows more buckets in the dynamic histogram, which entails higher processing cost, since our technique needs to inspect all histogram buckets to decide whether a query is answerable. Interestingly, when θ = 10 6 , the query overhead of Data-workload is much lower than that of Uniform-workload. To understand this, observe that the number of histogram buckets increases, only when the statistical database processes an answerable query (see Figure 2) . Since Data-workload permits a smaller processing capacity than Uniform-workload, few histogram buckets are created for Data-workload, and thus, the computation overhead is lower. This phenomenon does not occur when θ ≤ 10 5 , because the maximum numbers of histogram buckets entailed by each workloads is larger than 10 5 , i.e., given θ ≤ 10 5 , our technique have to utilize all θ buckets to process each workload, and hence, the computation overhead for both workloads is similar.
RELATED WORK
Output perturbation is first studied by the statistics community (see [2] for a survey). In particular, Denning [10] devises a method that proposes to answer queries on a random sample set of the underlying data; Fellegi and Phillips [15] devises a method that rounds each query result to the nearest multiple of a pre-defined number, while Achugbue and Chin [1] and Dalenius [9] investigate variations of this method. As pointed out in [12] , however, the existing approaches in the statistics literature mainly address the utility of perturbed query results, without providing solid guarantees on privacy preservation, which severely limits their practicability.
In [11] , Dinur and Nissim provide the first formal study on the amount of noise needed by any output perturbation scheme to ensure privacy in count queries. They show that, if an unlimited number of queries are allowed, the noise in each query answer must be linear to the dataset cardinality n; otherwise, an adversary may be able to restore the entire dataset precisely from the query results. As an unfortunate implication, when the dataset is sizable, query answers will have to be erroneous to avoid privacy disclosure. Dwork et al. [14] further prove that, even if the statistical database employs arbitrary noise in answering 0.269 fraction of the queries, and returns relatively accurate answers for the rest, an adversary can still reconstruct most tuples in the dataset.
To circumvent the problem, Blum et al. [6] propose a solution that permits only o(n) count queries, but provides more accurate answers. This solution is subsumed by the differential privacy mechanism [13] , which allows a larger number of queries and offers a higher degree of privacy protection. McSherry and Talwar [20] extend differential privacy for arbitrary queries, while Nissim et al. [22] improve the techniques in [13] by taking into account the smooth sensitivity of the queries.
Besides output perturbation, query restriction and input perturbation are also popular techniques for implementing statistical databases. Specifically, query restriction [8, 17, 21] works by denying queries that may lead to privacy breach, and returning exact answer for the other queries. Compared to output perturbation, this technique offers more useful query results, but weaker privacy protection. In particular, none of the existing query restriction technique can achieve -differential privacy.
When input perturbation is adopted, the statistical database first sanitizes the microdata with generalization [24, 25] or random perturbation [3, 4] , and then processes queries using the sanitized data. The major advantage of input perturbation is that it is able to answer any number of queries. Nevertheless, the benefit is at the cost of sacrificing query accuracy. Dwork et al. [13] prove that, for practical datasets, random perturbation necessarily incurs larger error than output perturbation, in achieving -differential privacy. They also show that generalization cannot be used to ensure -differential privacy at all.
CONCLUSIONS
Although -differential privacy has been established as an important paradigm for statistical databases, it remains unclear whether the paradigm can be efficiently applied when the incoming (count) queries have arbitrary predicates. This paper provides a pessimistic answer, by proving that evaluating -differential privacy is NPhard. Fortunately, as the second step, we show that it is possible to efficiently enforce this paradigm in a conservative manner. Our results lead to a histogram approach, which enables the processing of a majority of queries that qualify -differential privacy. Furthermore, given a query that violates the paradigm, our relaxation technique still provides a useful answer, as opposed to simply denying the query completely as in previous solutions.
Our work also opens several avenues for future research. First, in this paper we concentrate on statistical databases that answer count queries. It is interesting to investigate whether our solutions can be adapted to support other aggregate queries (e.g., SUM, MIN, MAX) as well. Second, the proposed solutions assume that there are no updates in the microdata. We plan to study extensions for the scenarios where only insertions are possible (i.e., append-only), and both insertions and deletions are allowed. Finally, our method is designed for relational tables. It is a challenging problem to devise output perturbation techniques for other types of microdata such as social networks, locations of moving objects, strings, etc.
Appendix: Proof of Lemma 1
We will prove the lemma, by a reduction from the Maximum 2-Satisfiability problem, which is NP-complete. Specifically, let F be a 2-CNF formula with m clauses on n variables vi (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Given an positive integer k, the Maximum 2-Satisfiability problem asks whether there is an assignment of boolean values to vi, such that at least k clauses in F evaluate to true.
Given any 2-CNF formula F , we construct a set Q of count queries on a microdata table T as follows. T contains n attributes A1, ..., An, all of which have a domain {0, 1, 2, 3}. For each clause in F , we create six queries in Q. Specifically, let cj be the j-th clause in F , such that cj involves the α-th and β-th variables xα and x β . Let b1, ..., bn be n integers, such that, for any i ∈ [1, n], we have bi = 0 if the negation of vi appears in cj, and bi = 1 otherwise. The six queries corresponding to cj are as follows 3 : Totally, Q contains 6m queries, which can be constructed from F in linear time. Next we will prove that, if and only if SL1(Q) ≥ 2k, there exists an assignment of boolean values to vi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) that satisfies at least k clauses in F . For that purpose, we will first show that the "only if" direction holds. Without loss of generality, assume that the first k clauses c1, ..., c k in F are satisfied under a certain assignment of vi. Based on this assignment, we construct a pair of sibling microdata tables T1 and T2 as follows. T1 contains only one tuple t1, such that for any i ∈ Consider the j-th clause (1 ≤ j ≤ k) cj in F , and the six queries qj1, ..., qj6 in Q constructed from cj . Let xα and x β be the two variables involved in cj . Without loss of generality, assume that xα and x β are assigned values true and f alse, respectively. In that case, t1 Similarly, it can be verified that qj1(T2) + qj2(T2) + qj3(T2) = 0, qj4(T2) + qj5(T2) + qj6(T2) = 1.
For convenience, given any microdata table T , we define Qj (T ) = qj1(T ) + qj2(T ) + qj3(T ), and Q j (T ) = qj4(T ) + qj5(T ) + qj6(T ). We have It remains to show that, if SL1(Q) ≥ 2k, there must exist an assignment of boolean values to vi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), such that at least k clauses in F are satisfied. Let T 3 and T 4 be a pair of sibling microdata tables, such that q∈Q q(T 3 ) − q(T 4 ) = SL1(Q). Recall that T 3 and T 4 differ in only one tuple. Let t3 (t4) be the tuple in T 3 (T 4 ) that does not appear in T 4 (T 3 ). Let T3 (T4) be a microdata table, such that t3 (t4) is the only tuple contained in T3 (T4). We have 
Because both T3 and T4 contain only one tuple, for any q ∈ Q, q(T3) and q(T4) take value zero or one. By Equation 14, either q∈Q q(T3) ≥ k or q∈Q q(T4) ≥ k must be true. Without loss of generality, assume that q∈Q q(T3) ≥ k. Then, 
Recall that, for any j ∈ [1, m], the query predicates in qj1, qj2, ..., qj6 are disjoint. Therefore, Qj(T3) + Q j (T3) takes value zero or one. Let J be the set of integers in [1, m] , such that for any j ∈ J, Qj(T3) + Q j (T3) = 1. By Equation 15 , |J| ≥ k holds. We are now ready to assign boolean values to vi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), such that at least k clauses in F evaluate to true. In particular, 
For any j ∈ J, let us consider the j-th clause cj in F , and the six queries qj1, ..., qj6 in Q constructed from cj . Since Qj(T3) + Q j (T3) = 1, t3 should satisfy the predicates in one of the six queries. Without loss of generality, assume that t3 fulfills the predicates in qj5. Let Aα and A β be the two attributes involved in qj4. , if bα = 0 (i.e., the negation of xα appears in cj ), we have xα = f alse. Otherwise, xα = true. This indicates that cj evaluates to true. Similarly, when t3[A β ] = 3−b β , it can be shown that cj is also satisfied. Therefore, for any j ∈ J, cj is satisfied under our assignment of boolean values to vi (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Since |J| ≥ k, the lemma is proved.
